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42 U.S.C. § 1983 - CIVIL RIGHTS - MUNCIPALITIES
LIABLE FOR MONEY DAMAGES. Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Petitioners Monell, Zapata, Terrall, and Abbey, female em-
ployees of the New York City Department of Social Services and
Board of Education, were compelled to take unpaid leaves of ab-
sence pursuant to the New York City maternity policy. The policy
required a pregnant employee to take leave without pay after the
fifth month of pregnancy unless the employee obtained permission
to continue working from the agency doctor and approval from the
agency head. None of the petitioners suffered incapacitating medi-
cal problems resulting from pregnancy that would have prevented
them from working past the fifth month. They brought suit against
New York City, the Board of Education, the Department of Social
Services, and individual agency officials, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief' and money damages in the form of back pay for
those months of mandatory leave. The action'was brought under
title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code, which allows an
award of damages to any citizen or other person who is deprived of
constitutionally protected rights by any "person."'
The district court dismissed petitioners' complaint, holding
that although the deprivation of rights was a result of an unconstitu-
1. Pending disposition of the suit, New York City amended its policy to allow pregnant
employees to continue working as long as they had the desire to work and were physically
capable of doing so. The lower court's ruling that this amendment mooted the prayer for
injunctive and declaratory relief was not challenged by the petitioners. Monell v. Dep't of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
The amended complaint additionally sought jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Acts of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the 1972 amendment to Title VII did
not apply retroactively to this case. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259, 261 (2d
Cir. 1976).
If any question existed whether Title VII would have been applicable to those facts, even
had the 1972 Amendment been retroactively applied, that question has now been resolved.
In October of 1978, President Carter signed into law P.L. No. 95-555, which adds section 701
(k) to the Act. By defining "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" to include pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions, and women affected thereby, the Congress sought
to foreclose arguments that employment decisions based on pregnancy were not necessarily
within the scope of Title VII.
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tional policy,' back pay could not be awarded. The court based its
ruling on Monroe v. Pape' which held municipalities and their gov-
ernmental units immune from section 1983 actions because they
were not "persons" within the meaning of that section.5 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Brennan held that muncipalities were "persons" within the
meaning of section 1983, and overruled Monroe v. Pape7 insofar as
it conferred a blanket immunity on municipalities in section 1983
actions. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).8
The federal civil remedy for the deprivation of constitutionally
guaranteed rights had its inception in the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1
The Act was introduced as H.R. 320 and was entitled "An Act to
Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution and for Other Purposes."' 0 Section 1 was designed to secure
equal protection for all citizens by providing a civil remedy against
"persons" who violated constitutionally protected rights. Sections
2 through 4 were an attempt to suppress rampant Ku Klux Klan
activity in the southern states. Section 1 passed both houses of
Congress as proposed, with little debate. The remainder of the bill,
with its drastic measures," was the object of heated debate and
3. The policy was held to be unconstitutional under the test promulgated in Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Board's maternity leave/return to work
policy was ruled "arbitrary and irrational" in that it created an irrebuttable presumption of
physical incapacity for all pregnant teachers. Id. at 644.
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. Monell v Dep't of Social Servs., 394 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
6. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 532 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1976). The court also found
that the individual defendants were "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 even when sued
in their official capacities, but no monetary damages could be assessed against them because
the city treasury would be ultimately responsible and the city was immune from money
damage awards under Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
8. The Supreme Court also held: (1) local governments are liable under § 1983 only
when the deprivation of constitutional rights arises out of a government policy and not under
a theory of respondeat superior, 436 U.S. at 691; (2) U.S. CONST. amend. X imposes no
obstacle to municipal liability, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54; (3) U.S. CONST. amend. XI does not
prohibit imposition of municipal liability, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54; (4) stare decisis will not be
applied mechanically to prevent the Court from overruling Monroe. 436 U.S. at 701.
9. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1871).
10. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978). See the text of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976), supra note 2.
11. Section 2 created new federal crimes to supplement section 2 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866; section 3 authorized the President to send militia into states racked with Klan
violence; section 4 provided for the suspension of habeas corpus in emergency situations.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665 n.11 (1978).
NOTES
amendment before eventual passage.
Before H.R. 320 came to a vote in the Senate, Senator Sherman
proposed an additional section to the bill (the Sherman Amend-
ment) which would have placed liability for damage to persons or
property occurring during "riotous and tumultuous" activity on the
private inhabitants of municipalities." Under the Sherman Amend-
ment, suit could be brought by the injured party or his personal
representative against the "county, city, or parish" where the dam-
age occurred, and that county, city, or parish would in turn levy the
judgment against the property of any of its inhabitants who were
involved in the damaging riot.' 3 The purpose of the amendment was
to discourage the landed populace from violating the civil rights
laws by making their property subject to levy and execution. 4 The
Senate passed the Sherman Amendment with H.R. 320, but the
House of Representatives was strongly opposed to the Amendment.
The House concluded that Congress had no authority under the
Constitution to impose an "obligation"' 5 on a muncipality, a "mere
instrumentality for the administration of state law."' 6
Congress, unable to agree on the Sherman Amendment, for-
warded that portion of the bill to a joint conference committee for
modification. The first revision of the Amendment would have
placed liability for civil rights violations indirectly on municipali-
ties. When any individual defendant who was joined in the action
defaulted on the judgment against him, the county, city, or parish
where the damage occurred became liable and subject to a lien upon
its treasury and property. To reduce the burden upon municipali-
ties, the bill further provided the municipality with a right of in-
demnification from those individuals who defaulted on the judg-
ment.'7 This version of the Sherman Amendment passed in the Sen-
ate, but the House continued to oppose the placing of any
"obligation" on municipalities without express constitutional
power. '8
12. The text of the Sherman Amendment appears in full in the Appendix to the opinion.
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 702 (1978).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 667 n.16 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 761 (1871) [hereinafter
cited as GLOBE]).
15. The precise meaning of the term, "obligation," is not clear from a reading of the
debates. See GLOBE at 804. The United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961), construed "obligation" to mean monetary liability. See note 29 infra. Seventeen
years later in Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 679 (1978), the Court re-construed
"obligation" to mean a requirement that municipalities establish peacekeeping forces.
16. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (quoting GLOBE at 804).
17. Id. at 703, 704 (quoting GLOBE at 749).
18. Id. at 668, 703-704 (quoting GLOBE at 755).
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The second and final version of the Sherman Amendment re-
ported out of committee complied with the demands of the House.
This version abandoned an attempt to hold municipalities liable for
riot damage. 19 Instead it joined as conspirators subject to liability
any individuals who had knowledge of an impending riot and who
failed to take steps to prevent it. This version was adopted by both
houses of Congress and is now codified as title 42, section 1986 of
the United States Code. 21
After the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was adopted, fear arose
throughout the nation that if the Act were given full force and effect
by the courts, the power of the states to create and enforce their own
laws could be severely impaired or destroyed. 2' In reaction to the
fear for states' sovereignty, federal courts in the late nineteenth
century limited the scope of section 1983.22 The most effective limi-
tation was accomplished by applying the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity to exclude municipalities and their officials acting under
"color of law" from the meaning of "person" under section 1983.23
Municipal immunity was declared to be absolute in Monroe v.
Pape,'24 a suit against the City of Chicago and thirteen of its police
officers who made an illegal search of plaintiff's apartment and
unlawfully detained him at police headquarters. 25 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the
claim against the officers but affirmed dismissal as to the City of
Chicago. The Court based its decision on a narrow interpretation of
legislative intent 2 regarding municipal liability in civil rights ac-
19. Id. at 704 (quoting GLOBE at 804).
20. Id. at 669.
21. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HsAv. L. REV. 1133
(1977).
22. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880), see generally Developments in the
Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 H.av. L. REv. 1133 (1977).
23. Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 H~Av. L. REV. 1133,
1191 (1977). Other limitations not on point to this discussion extended immunity to those
who violated the civil rights of another but who believed they were acting under color of valid
law, see, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1964); and extended immunity to violators who
had no intent to deprive any person of constitutionally protected rights, see, e.g., Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
24. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also Egan v. City of Aurora, 365 U.S. 514 (1961).
25. Thirteen police officers broke into Monroe's apartment without a warrant, sub-
jected his family to personal indignities, and ransacked his home. He was then detained at
police headquarters, incommunicado, on "open charges" and questioned about a two-day old
murder without benefit of counsel. No criminal charges were filed against him. Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
26. Section 1983 provides a remedy for "constitutional torts." Since there was no com-
mon law dealing with this type of tort, legislative intent had to be analyzed in order to
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tions.2 7 Mr. Justice Douglas reasoned that Congress did not intend
to hold a municipality liable for civil rights violations because the
House of Representatives never conceded to the "obligation" which
the Sherman Amendment 8 would have placed on municipalities.2 '
Douglas presumed the term "obligation" to mean monetary liability
for actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 .0 Therefore,
the Court held that municipal corporations were not "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983 and consequently were wholly
immune from liability.3 1
After Monroe, federal courts attempted to alleviate the harsh
effect of municipal immunity by restricting the availability of im-
munity to those cases in which money damages were sought. A
footnote in the Monroe decision 3 was interpreted by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals as allowing the imposition of injunctive relief
against the city of Lawton, Oklahoma.3 In United States v. Jackson
the Fifth Circuit enjoined enforcement of an ordinance which re-
quired racial segregation in city rail and bus terminals.34 The Sev-
enth Circuit in Adams v. City of Park Ridge issued an injunction
to prevent enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting solicitation of
funds for charitable purposes. 35 The Jackson and Adams courts rea-
soned that the justification for denying an award of money damages
against a municipality-that of foreseeable financial ruin-was not
present where equitable relief was requested .3
In reaction to the above "bifurcated application" 37 of the word
"person," which viewed a municipality as a person within the mean-
ing of section 1983 for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief
but not a person for the purpose of money damages, the United
construe the meaning of the statute. Bliss, Judge, & Schirott, Civil Rights Act: A Close Look
at Proper Parties, 18 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 105, 109 (1974).
27. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
28. See note 12 supra.
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 190 (1961).
30. Id. at 191. See Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 135 (1972).
31. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961). See cases listed in Bliss, Judge, & Schi-
rott, Civil Rights Act: A Close Look at Proper Parties, 18 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 105, 115 (1974).
32. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 n.50 (1961).
33. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). In the Dailey decision, an
injunction was issued to prevent the city from denying a building permit for low-cost housing.
34. 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1963).
35. 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961).
36. United States v. Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 11 (5th Cir. 1963); Adams v. City of Park
Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,
335 F. Supp. 947 (D.N.H. 1971).
37. Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512 (1973).
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States Supreme Court in Kenosha v. Bruno declared that munici-
palities were wholly immune from section 1983 actions for any pur-
pose .31 Mr. Justice Rehnquist based his reasoning on the legislative
intent as analyzed by the Court in Monroe and found no indication
that the nature of the relief sought should have any bearing on the
interpretation of the word "person.
39
The United States Supreme Court in Monell v. Department of
Social Services" extensively reviewed the Congressional debates on
the Sherman Amendment and determined that there was no discus-
sion evincing an intent to exclude municipalities from monetary
liability under section 1983.11 Mr. Justice Brennan stated that the
Court in Monroe erred in its interpretation of the "obligation"
which the Sherman Amendment would have placed on municipali-
ties. The "obligation" to establish police forces, not to pay money
damages, was the duty which the opponents of the Amendment
declared to be beyond the constitutional power of Congress." By
imposing liability on the municipality for a breach of the peace,
Congress would have been indirectly compelling the municipality to
create peacekeeping forces-a usurpation of authority delegated to
the states. " However, even the opponents of the Amendment found
that Congress had the power to impose liability upon a municipality
that violated fourteenth amendment rights by abusing or failing to
enforce the peacekeeping obligation imposed on it by the state."
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified at title 42, section
1983 of the United States Code, was an exercise of the Congressional
power to protect constitutional rights, and no more. Consequently,
Brennan found nothing in the debates on the Sherman Amendment
evincing an intent that municipalities be immune from actions for
civil rights violations under section 1983. 45
Brennan argued that the word "person" in section 1983 applied
to legal as well as natural persons. 4 He reasoned that in 1871, when
the statute was passed, corporations, including municipal corpora-
38. Id. See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(vacating and remanding lower court's reinstatement of teacher with back pay); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (affirming lower court's dismissal of suit for injunctive relief and
back pay brought by employee of county treasurer's office).
39. Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512 (1973).
40. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
41. Id. at 683.
42. Id. at 679.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 680 (Rep. Poland).
45. Id. at 683.
46. Id.
NOTES
tions or "bodies politic," were widely recognized as being equal to
natural persons before the law.47 In February of 1871 Congress had
denominated corporations as "persons" in the Dictionary Act,",
thereby recognizing that the usual meaning of "person" included
corporations. Brennan found that Congress was clearly aware of the
fact that municipal corporations were suable entities under section
1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871." 9
Monell may have an important impact on future civil rights
litigation. Victims of discrimination are no longer barred from seek-
ing monetary redress for wrongs perpetrated by the customs and
policies of municipalities. Further, the mere possibility of having
to pay a large settlement may cause errant municipalities to align
their policies and customs with constitutionally acceptable stan-
dards. 0 The full impact of the decison, however, may not be felt for
some time due to the Court's failure to address the scope of munici-
pal liability.5 ' Many questions remain as to the degree and extent
of liability, defenses available to the municipality, and identifica-
tion of funds available to satisfy any judgment against the city.
Arkansas, too, may be affected by the decision in Monell. Title
12, section 2901 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated, 52 which ex-
pressly extended tort immunity to municipalities, is in direct con-
flict with Monell. It states as follows:
State subdivisions immune from tort liability- It is hereby de-
clared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all
counties, municipal corporations, school districts, special improve-
ment districts, and all other political subdivisions of the State
shall be immune from liability for damages, and no tort action
shall lie against any such political subdivision, on account of the
acts of their agents andemployees.
Arkansas case law has not dealt directly with the issue of mu-
nicipal liability in section 1983 actions. However, there have been
decisions dealing with the liability of other "bodies politic" under
47. Id. at 687.
48. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). The Act reads, in part, "tTJhe
word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate .. "After amend-
ment the definition was codified in 1 U.S.C. § 1, and reads, in part, "[Tihe words 'person'
and 'whoever' include corporations . . . as well as individuals .... "
49. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 686 (1978).
50. See McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REv. 1 (1974). See generally Bristow, .§
1983: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. Rxv. 255 (1975).
51. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978).
52. (1968).
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section 1983. These entities include school boards and their individ-
ual members,53 members of the Board of Trustees of a state sup-
ported college,5" and the State Department of Corrections."
School boards are considered sub-divisions of the state under
title 12, section 3406 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated" for the
purpose of tort liability, 57 but boards, as state bodies, have not gen-
erally been considered "persons" within the meaning of section
1983. 51 In order for an individual school board member to enjoy
immunity from section 1983 actions, he must act in good faith in a
manner not calculated to deprive the constitutional rights of anyone
subordinate to him. 59 The test of good faith has predictably resulted
in a great deal of uncertainty in the law due to the necessity of
determining the elements of good faith on a case by case basis.
In Floyd v. Trice ° the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
enjoined board members and the school Superintendent of Texar-
kana from enforcing a continuing racially discriminatory policy
against students. In Williams v. Anderson"' the Eighth Circuit de-
clared that although board members were entitled to assert a quali-
fied immunity, the board members and Superintendent of Brinkley
schools were nevertheless liable under section 1983 because they
were put on notice by federal law62 that their policy of hiring and
promoting teachers violated plaintiff's constitutionally protected
rights. Board members and the school Superintendent were found
53. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081 (8th
Cir. 1977); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974); Floyd v. Trice, 490 F.2d 1154 (8th
Cir. 1974).
54. Board of Trustees v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
55. Heard v. Boren, 368 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
56. (Cum. Supp. 1977). It reads: "State officers defined-Elected state officials and
members of commissions, boards, or other governing bodies of agencies are officers of the
State of Arkansas for the purposes of this Act."
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3401 (Cum. Supp. 1977) reads:
State payment of damages for act of state officer or employee- The State of
Arkansas shall pay actual, but not punitive, damages adjudged by a state or federal
court, or entered by such a court as a result of a compromise settlement approved
and recommended by the Attorney General, against officers or employees of the
State of Arkansas or against the estate of such an officer or employee, based on an
act or omission by the officer or employee while acting without malice and in good
faith within the course and scope of his employment and in the performance of his
official duties.
58. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir.
1974); see generally Comment, Suing the School Board Under Section 1983, 21 S.D. L. REV.
452 (1976).
59. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
60. 490 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. 562 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1977).
62. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 216(b) (1976).
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to be "persons" subject to suit in Bramlet v. Wilson,13 a section 1983
action for cruel and unusual corporal punishment.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to rule on the
immune status of a state supported college in Board of Trustees of
Arkansas A & M College v. Davis.4 The court in Davis, however,
did hold individual members of the Board of Trustees liable for
money damages in that action for racial discrimination in the dis-
missal of a faculty member."
The State Department of Corrections is included within the
meaning of title 12, section 3401 of the Arkansas Statutes Anno-
tated. In Heard v. Boren 7 the Department was held immune from
money damages under section 1983 in a suit brought by a prisoner
who sustained aggravated physical injury due to the oversight of the
prison physician who failed to recommend the prisoner be exempt
from heavy yard work.
Foreseeably, many suits for violations of civil rights could arise
in Arkansas because Monell impliedly repeals the statutory immun-
ity conferred on municipalities. 6 Municipal governments should re-
evaluate their policies, especially in hiring, promoting, dismissals,
and maternity and sick leaves to insure that no constitutional viola-
tions exist. Citizens now have a functional remedy against munici-
palities whose policies and customs violate protected rights.
Terry Clayton Paulson
63. 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
64. 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968). Other jurisdictions have
held that state supported universities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. Braden
v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973); Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir.
1969); Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F. Supp. 789 (D. Hawaii 1973).
65. Board of Trustees v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
66. (Cum. Supp. 1977). See note 57 supra.
67. 368 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
68. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (1968).
1979] 427
